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Labor Arbitration and Federal
Pre-emption: The Overruling of
Black v. Cutter Laboratories
In the 1956 case of Black v. Cutter Laboratories, the
United States Supreme Court exhibited some judicial hos-
tility toward the labor arbitration process by allowing a
state court to overturn an arbitration board determination
that an employee had been fired for her union activity and
not for her communist affiliations. In this Article, Pro-
fessor Kovarsky examines the opinions of the arbitration
board, the California Supreme Court, and the United
States Supreme Court in the Black case, and then analyzes
subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions involv-
ing both communism and judicial review of arbitration
awards in labor disputes. He concludes on the basis of
these later cases that Black v. Cutter Laboratories has
been impliedly overruled and that a federal policy de-
ferring to arbitration avards in labor disputes has been
announced that pre-empts the field.
Irving Kovarsky*
The substantial use of labor arbitration as a democratic means
of resolving employer-union differences is a twentieth century
development. During the formative years of the United States, in-
dustrialists, economists, and judges exhibited hostility toward
unions, and the growth of organized labor and collective bargain-
ing was retarded. Since unions were not in a position to make
many demands, even in the limited industrial areas where collec-
tive bargaining was practiced, labor arbitration was resorted to in-
frequently. Starting with the Railway Labor Act of 1926,' the
Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932,2 and the National Labor Rela-
*Associate Professor, Department of Management, Southern Illinois
University. The author wishes to thank Philip T. Legendre, graduate student
at Southern Illinois University, for his assistance.
1. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1958).
2. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). See § 102, which
discloses the need for union representation, and § 108, which specifies that:
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tions Act of 1935,1 each of which stamped federal approval on
the social desirability of union growth, organized labor became
powerful, and the use of arbitration spread. The Norris-La Guardia
Act, primarily concerned with the labor injunction, expresses the
need for union organization and the desirability, from a public
viewpoint, of collective bargaining. The Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 19471 was intended to equalize labor-management
power and responsibility and the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 19596 was designed to protect both em-
ployee and employer from union racketeering, undemocratic
procedures, and some forms of economic pressures, but organi-
zed labor remains a potent economic and political force in spite
of these legislative dampers. With unions and employers con-
stantly at odds, the need for arbitration is apparent even where
there is evidence of good faith and mutual respect.
The judicial attitude toward both commercial and labor arbi-
tration has been negative. In many respects, the badgering of
the arbitration process by the courts is peculiar since some claim
that our judicial system itself is an outgrowth of voluntary arbi-
tration.7 In addition, the procedure developed in the mercantile
courts about the twelfth century resembled more closely the arbi-
tration process than a technical legal proceeding.' Arbitration has
been subjected to judicial review all too frequently in the past.
No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any com-
plainant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law
which is involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to
make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotia-
tion or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of medi-
ation or voluntary arbitration.
3. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1958), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-64 (Supp. III, 1962).
4. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 102, 108 (1958).
5. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1958), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-87 (Supp. III, 1962).
6. 73 Stat. 519-46 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. III, 1962).
7. See, e.g., SEAGLE, THE HISTORY OF LAW 60-61 (1946).
8. 5 ENCYC. Soc. ScI. Law Merchant 270-74 (1937). After commerce
became important in medieval Italy, specialized tribunals sprang up to deal
with problems peculiar to the merchant. At first the consules communi,
made up of important corporate officials, were given the power to ad-
minister this new system. The consules communi turned the increasing work
load over to judiciary consuls and later help was sought from the consules
mercatorum, who were in charge of guilds. Gradually the jurisdiction of
the consules mercatorum was extended to the foreign merchant. Remedies
provided bore a moral rather than a legalistic stamp, and lawyers were
not permitted to appear at hearings. This system, with some modification
and change, spread throughout Europe and Asia. It should be noted that
the Roman system was concerned with commercial arbitration rather than
labor arbitration.
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Starting with Marbury v. Madison,9 which approved judicial re-
view of legislative action, judicial control was naturally extended
to administrative agencies and arbitrators. Since arbitration is con-
tractually conceived, judges intervened on the basis of their
ability and function to interpret contracts.
Courts have been "in the driver's seat" for a long time, and they
zealously guard against any erosion of judicial prerogatives. This
power has resulted in interference with the arbitration process and
has limited the effectiveness of "private jurisprudence." Although
revolutionary changes have taken place recently and courts have
begun to act with restraint, to this day they exhibit needless
antagonism toward arbitration.10 As evidence of this, the Supreme
Court during its last term had to reiterate its position, which some
lower courts had ignored, that an agreement to arbitrate is bind-
ing."
Subversion, communism, and the rights protected in the first
and fourteenth amendments have received considerable attention
from congressional investigators, newspapers, learned journals,
and individuals and groups concerned with the territorial safety
of the United States and the protection of civil liberties. The de-
cisions of many arbitrators and judges that permitted the discharge
of employees for communist tendencies reflected the political cli-
mate that followed World War II. In some instances, the em-
ployees discharged for communistic sympathies had been active in
their unions-a fact that raises the question of whether the em-
ployer was simply patriotic or was antiunion in violation of federal
legislation.
When judicial antagonism toward arbitration is coupled with an
understandable desire to prevent the growth of communism and
subversion, court hostility is noticeable and decisions are some-
times intemperate. This Article hopes to develop the notion that
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. See Local 1386, Textile Workers v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d
894 (4th Cir. 1961); Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. v. Steelworkers Union, 289 F.2d
103 (6th Cir. 1961); Local 201, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec.
Co., 283 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1961); Local 1357, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.
Food Fair Stores, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1961). It should be
noted that these decisions were made after United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957). The Steelworkers cases granted sweeping protection to the
arbitration process. See text accompanying notes 67-87 infra.
11. See Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370
U.S. 254 (1962), affirming 294 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.), withdrawing on re-
hearing in banc 287 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1961).
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Black v. Cutter Laboratories,2 which involved arbitration and
communism, is such a decision, and that it has been impliedly
overruled by subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
I. BLACK v. CUTTER LABORATORIES
In 1946, Mrs. Doris Walker, a member of the Communist Party,
was given a clerical job with Cutter Laboratories after falsifying
an employment questionnaire. The employer in 1947 learned of
Mrs. Walker's membership in the Communist Party, but did not
discharge her. Throughout her employment, Mrs. Walker was an
active member in a left-wing labor organization. Although sub-
mitting a noncommunist affidavit required by the Taft-Hartley
Act,"3 Mrs. Walker refused to testify before the NLRB with re-
spect to membership in the Communist Party. In 1949, difficulty
was experienced in negotiating a new contract. A strike resulted,
and an unfair labor practice charge was brought against Cutter
Laboratories. The union sponsored a broadcast giving its point
of view, and a vice-president of the firm expressed anger because
of the publicity. Mrs. Walker was later discharged.
A. THE ARBITRATION BOARD DECISION
A tripartite board was convened to arbitrate the discharge, and
Mrs. Walker, during the course of the hearing, refused to testify
with respect to her membership in the Communist Party. The ma-
jority opinion issued by the arbitration board, couched in strong
language and concerned with civil liberties, explained Mrs. Walk-
er's refusal to testify.
First, the consequence of answering that question . . . is economic
death because more and more private employers are placing them-
selves in the positions of the guardians . . . of the so-called loyalty of
employees and a process is developing in this country which, if car-
ried to its logical conclusion, would result in the elimination of the
Communist issue by the method always preferred by Fascists . . . a
process which history shows never ends with Communists but always
goes on to liberals, trade unionists, people of minority races and
colors, and finally the destruction of all culture. 14
The majority of the panel concluded that Mrs. Walker was not
discharged for her communistic bent, but for her active role in
12. 351 U.S. 292, rehearing denied, 352 U.S. 859 (1956).
13. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(h), 61 Stat.
146 (1947). This requirement was repealed by the Landrum-Griffin Act,
§ 201(d), 73 Stat. 525 (1959).
14. Cutter Labs., 15 Lab. Arb. 431, 441 (1950).
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the union; that the "policing of the political doctrine and philoso-
phy of Communism, is not within the province of private em-
ployers; that the history of the labor movement indicates all too
frequently that the charge of Communism is either a fabrication
or a lever seized upon by employers for the purpose of inter-
fering with, weakening or destroying trade unions and that such
was the motive here.' ' 5
The majority indicated that an arbitration hearing was not the
proper forum to consider problems of democratic survival.10 An
important point made by the arbitration board, in light of later
United States Supreme Court decisions,' 7 was that the collec-
tive bargaining contract authorized the arbitration board to make
this decision.'"
B. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DECISION
The case came before the California Supreme Court" after the
lower state courts approved the arbitration award. ° The Califor-
nia court, reversing the lower courts, ruled that the award was
unenforceable because it was contrary to the public policy of Cal-
ifornia and because the arbitrators had exceeded their authority.
In many respects, the majority opinion of the California Su-
preme Court is confusing. The court invoked section 1288 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure,2' which permits the vacating
of an arbitration award if authority is exceeded. Yet in no man-
ner did the court disclose how the arbitrator exceeded his au-
thority based upon the collective bargaining agreement. Presum-
ably, the court meant that the arbitrator exceeded his authority
by rendering a decision contrary to the laws of California.2 The
15. Ibid.
16. Id. at 442. The majority position was weakened by this irrelevant ref-
erence, for an employer actually can discharge an employee for communism
because of a need for security, damage to business reputation, and so
forth. See Hearst Publishing Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 642 (1958); New York Mir-
ror, 27 Lab. Arb. 548 (1956); Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 27 Lab. Arb.
265 (1956); New York Times Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 609 (1956); Liquid Car-
bonic Corp., 22 Lab. Arb. 709 (1954); Publishers' Ass'n, 19 Lab. Arb. 40
(1952); Los Angeles Daily News, 19 Lab. Arb. 39 (1952); Bell Aircraft Corp.
16 Lab. Arb. 234 (1951); Jackson Indus., Inc., 9 Lab. Arb. 753 (1948).
17. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574(1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
18. 15 Lab. Arb. at 442-43.
19. Black v. Cutter Labs., 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955), writ of
cert. dismissed, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
20. Black v. Cutter Labs., 266 P.2d 92 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1954).
21. Black v. Cutter Labs., 43 Cal. 2d 788, 798, 278 P.2d 905, 911
(1955).
22. The court said "the very award itself is illegal in that it orders re-
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court referred (1) to the California Criminal Syndicalism Act,23
which describes prohibited revolutionary conduct, (2) to the pres-
ence of a "clear and present danger" as determined by the Califor-
nia legislature and courts, and (3) to the subversive nature of the
Communist Party as described by the United States Supreme Court
in Dennis v. United States.24 But there was no finding that Mrs.
Walker's membership in the union constituted "a clear and pres-
ent danger" to California nor that the state and federal laws con-
trolling communist activity were designed to reach mere member-
ship in a particular organization. In fact, the Dennis case, relied
upon by the court as precedent, did not hold that membership in
the Communist Party constituted a crime under the federal law.
The dissenting opinion by Justice Traynor followed the line of
reasoning adhered to by the arbitration board and noted that
the firm, by waiting more than two years after knowing of Mrs.
Walker's communist affiliation and her falsification of the employ-
ment questionnaire, waived the right of discharge.25 It should be
noted that Justice Traynor's opinion is in line with decisions sub-
sequently made by the United States Supreme Court in Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills26 and the later Steelworkers cases.
Lincoln Mills stands for the proposition that an agreement to arbi-
trate is enforceable under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, and
the later cases-Warrior & Gulf,27 Enterprise Wheel & Car,2" and
American Mfg. Co. 29-limited judicial review of an arbitration
award.
The question of federal pre-emption was not discussed in the
California Supreme Court majority opinion although reference
was made to the Internal Security Act of 1950,30 the Smith Act
of 1948,1 and the Communist Control Act of 1954.32 Nor was
mention made of the unfair labor practice provisions of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the noncommunist affidavit submitted by Mrs. Walk-
instatement as an employee of one whose dedication to and active support
of communist principles and practices stands proved and unchallenged in
the record." Id. at 800, 278 P.2d at 912.
23. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11400-02.
24. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
25. 43 Cal. 2d at 809-10, 278 P.2d at 918.
26. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
27. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
28. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
29. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
30. 64 Stat. 987-1030 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-824
(1958).
31. 62 Stat. 807-12 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2381-90 (1958).
32. 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1958).
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er, or section 301, a section that did not become significant until
Lincoln Mills. Justice Traynor anticipated the federal-state jurisdic-
tional dichotomy and noted that the federal government had ex-
ercised its pre-emptive powers; he was concerned, however, not
with federal pre-emption of labor relations, but with the protec-
tion of national security, an interest paramount to that of the
state.33
C. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION
The United States Supreme Court decision in Black v. Cutter
Laboratories,3" made in 1956, pointed to the broad statements
made by the California Supreme Court that an order to enforce
an arbitration award violates public policy.35 Mr. Justice Clark,
writing for the majority in dismissing the writ of certiorari for lack
of a substantial federal question, did not mention section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act and refused to consider civil rights guaran-
tees, feeling that the decision by the California Supreme Court
was adequately grounded in state law and was not limited to a
violation of state public policy.3" According to Mr. Justice Clark,
the case involved a contract governed by California law, under
which a discharge for "just cause" may include membership in
the Communist Party. He added that "of course, the scope of re-
view of such findings under the California Arbitration Act is a
matter exclusively for the courts of that State, and is not our con-
cern. ')38 As will be shown, the United States Supreme Court, as
well as the California court in McCarroll v. Los Angeles County
District Council of Carpenters,39 have not followed this line of
reasoning.
33. Justice Traynor stated:
It is a rash assumption that Congress and the Legislature have been
inept in their consideration of the problem, or are incapable of meeting
it . . . .As the very authorities cited in the majority opinion make
clear, neither Congress in enacting subversive control legislation nor
the executive department in enforcing it has been insensitive to the
nation's security ...
43 Cal. 2d at 812-13, 278 P.2d at 919-20.
34. 351 U.S. 292, rehearing denied, 352 U.S. 859 (1956).
35. 351 U.S. at 297.
36.
We believe that the Supreme Court of California construed the term
"just cause" to embrace membership in the Communist Party, and re-
fused to apply a doctrine of waiver. As such, the decision involves only
California's construction of a local contract under local law, and there-
fore no substantial federal question is presented. Moreover, even if the
State Court's opinion be considered ambiguous, we should choose the
interpretation which does not face us with a constitutional question.
Id. at 299.
37. Id. at 298.
38. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
39. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932
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The postulation that the contracting parties might have agreed
that membership in the Communist Party constituted "just
cause" for discharge is unreasonable. Not a scintilla of evidence
was offered to indicate that an agreement had ever been consider-
ed that would have made a discharge for membership in the
Communist Party a discharge for "just cause." In fact, since the
union was considered to be left wing, it seems unlikely that the
"just cause" provision could ever have been given such an inter-
pretation. Furthermore, the Taft-Hartley Act requires that if a par-
ty desires to modify the existing collective bargaining contract, he
must serve written notice upon the other party.4" There was no
evidence or allegation by either party of a written notice to modify
the existing agreement.
Mr. Justice Douglas, presenting the minority view through a
civil rights approach, felt that the real issue was the protective
cloak of the first and fourteenth amendments and the need for gov-
ernment impartiality where different economic viewpoints are
held.41 Mr. Justice Douglas was uncertain as to the employer's rea-
son for discharging Mrs. Walker-it was either her union activities
or her belief in communism-but he felt Mrs. Walker should be
protected in either event, for union adherents are entitled to the
protection of the Taft-Hartley Act, and "belief cannot be penal-
(1958). In this case, the California Supreme Court acknowledged federal
pre-emption in matters blanketed by the Taft-Hartley Act. Justice Traynor,
writing the majority opinion, ruled that the federal law controlling col-
lective bargaining contracts is applicable. Although Justice Traynor was
concerned with injunctive relief and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, he specifi-
cally stated:
State courts therefore have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts
over actions that can be brought in the federal courts under section
301. It is obvious that in exercising this jurisdiction state courts are
no longer free to apply state law, but must apply the federal law of
collective bargaining agreements ....
Id. at 60, 315 P.2d at 330. McCarroll was decided after Lincoln Mills, and
tends to follow policy established by the United States Supreme Court.
While the issue of communism was not at stake in McCarroll, it seems
that the California Supreme Court has reversed itself and that Black is no
longer "good" law. The decision in McCarroll is in line with United States
Supreme Court decisions favoring federal pre-emption in situations where
a state law requires the licensing of union agents, Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S.
538 (1945), bargaining with a union composed of foremen, Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947), certifica-
tion by a state, LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U.S. 18 (1949), injunctions prohibiting recognition picketing, UMW v.
Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956), and injunctions prohibiting
picketing where supervisors are involved, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v.
Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962), 17 MINN. L. REV. 656 (1963).
40. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
41. 351 U.S. at 300-02 (1956).
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ized consistently with the First Amendment."' Supporting the
antiunion motive found by the arbitration board, Mr. Justice
Douglas noted that Mrs. Walker was discharged more than two
years after her wrongdoing was discovered.
In Black, the power to make an award was taken out of
the hands of the arbitration board because of the communist
taint of the employee. The Supreme Court exhibited a reluctance
to extend the protection of federal laws to an employee of ques-
tionable loyalty. Thus, under the guise of contract interpretation
and public policy, the opinion of the California Supreme Court
was substituted for the award of the arbitration board.
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
SUBSEQUENT TO BLACK v. CUTTER LABORATORIES
A. PENNSYLVANIA V. NELSON
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson,'3 decided after the California Su-
preme Court published its opinion in Black, a question of federal
pre-emption arose in a case involving a Pennsylvania statute aim-
ed at the control of sedition. The United States Supreme Court,
affirming the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, de-
cided that the federal government had exercised its pre-emptive
power by enacting comprehensive legislation controlling commu-
nism. The Court based its decision on the grounds that the federal
interest in national security is paramount to the state interest 4
and that attempting to enforce a state law prohibiting sedition cre-
ates the possibility of conflict with federal enforcement as well as
a multiplicity of suits.45 The decision also referred to state inter-
ference with investigations being conducted by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. 6 In addition, article I, section 8 of the United
States Constitution delegates to the federal government the duty
of defending the United States, and subversion is basically a prob-
lem of national defense.
Justice Traynor indicated in Black that the use of contract law
as a jurisdictional device to retain state control is improper in
controversies involving communism. It seems that the Supreme
Court accepted this view one year later in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
42. Id. at 304. Justice Traynor had anticipated the argument based on
the first and fourteenth amendments in his dissent in the California Supreme
Court.
43. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
44. Id. at 504-05.
45. Id. at 505-08.
46. Id. at 507.
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although contract law, a traditional playground for the exercise
of state jurisdiction, was not considered. Yet the Court in Black
found an adequate state ground for its decision and failed to con-
sider pre-emption based upon the federal legislation passed to
contain communism.
B. TEXTILE WORKERS UNION V. LINCOLN MILLS
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,"7 a landmark and
controversial decision,4" a union and an employer negotiated a
contract providing for the arbitration of disputes. Because of a dis-
agreement over work-loads and work-assignments, the union sought
an order forcing the employer to arbitrate under section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act.49 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the majority
opinion, noted that Congress endorsed the use of arbitration
as a democratic means of maximizing plant justice and industrial
peace and maintained that section 301 must be interpreted in
this light." The Court ordered enforcement of the agreement to
arbitrate under section 301, a solution not considered in Black.
Mr. Justice Douglas charged lower courts with the task of develop-
ing, obviously in a piecemeal fashion, contractual ground rules."
He explicitly stated that "federal interpretation of the federal law
will govern, not state law. . . But state law, if compatible with
the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule
that will best effectuate the federal policy.
47. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
48. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957).
49. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
may be brought in any district court.... .61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
50. 353 U.S. at 453-56.
51. Id. at 457. In some respects the Supreme Court approach, ordering
the federal courts to fashion a body of law to control arbitration, is
startling since legislative or judicial indicators are absent. There is little in
the Taft-Hartley Act that could be used for judicial guidance, and the Su1-
preme Court mandate is a rather obvious display of the rule-making powers
of a court.
52. Ibid. In line with the position taken in Lincoln Mills, Justice Traynor,
in McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d
45, 60, 315 P.2d 322, 330 (1957), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 932 (1958), also
indicated that a state court must apply substantive federal law where juris-
diction is concurrent. See note 39 supra.
The United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958), has been in-
terpreted to exclude collective bargaining contracts from coverage. In Lo-
cal 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 100 (Ist
Cir. 1956) the court took the position that collective bargaining contracts
are protected by § I of the Arbitration Act; although the decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court, the legal support assigned for enforcement
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Without question, the Taft-Hartley Act was intended to encour-
age collective bargaining and the settlement of disputes by pri-
vate means.53 As a consequence, it seems that Congress could
have clearly outlined the methods by which agreements to arbitrate
would be enforced. Section 301 only refers to "suits for violation of
contracts," and the Taft-Hartley Act does not assign power of en-
forcement to the courts. According to Justice Douglas, however,
courts can enforce agreements to arbitrate without specific au-
thorization in the Taft-Hartley Act.'M
For the purpose of evaluating Black, federal policy favor-
ing collective bargaining and arbitration is clearly enunciated and
expresses the pre-emptive will of Congress.' To engage in col-
lective bargaining, a contractual undertaking is necessary; there-
fore, federal pre-emption seems explicit. In fact, section 8 (d) of
the Taft-Hartley Act requires a written contract if requested. Per-
mitting state law to undermine the arbitration process on the basis
of contract law appears to be contrary to congressional intent.
The decision in Black came before Lincoln Mills, but public pol-
icy favoring collective bargaining and arbitration was no different
when the Black decision was rendered. Furthermore, even before
Lincoln Mills, there was some speculation whether section 301 cre-
ated a new federal right.5' 6 It is difficult to understand why the
Court in Black did not consider pre-emption based on section 301.
Lincoln Mills holds that a new substantive right was created by
section 301.11 Mr. Justice Douglas also stated:
was § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act rather than the Arbitration Act. General
Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
53. See Labor-Management Relations Act §§ 201-04, 61 Stat. 152-54
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-74 (1958).
54. 353 U.S. at 455.
55. In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959),
the United States Supreme Court held that a state court could not award
damages to an employer economically injured by a union seeking the right
of representation and a union shop agreement because the dispute was
pre-empted by federal law. Even though the NLRB had not exercised juris-
diction, state courts could not regulate the picketing activities. According
to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, if "the activity regulated was a merely peripheral
concern of the Labor Management Relations Act," or "the regulated conduct
touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in
the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that
Congress had deprived the States of the power to act," then the individual
state can regulate the labor dispute. Id. at 243-44. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Garmon could not apply either exception to deny federal regulation.
How can Black be pigeonholed into either exception to federal regulation?
56. See Comment, The Specific Enforcement of Collective Bargaining
Agreements Under Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 21 U. CiI.
L. REV. 251, 253-54 (1954).
57. 353 U.S. at 456-57.
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It seems, therefore, clear to us that Congress adopted a policy which
placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes, by
implication rejecting the common-law rule . . . against enforcement
of executory agreements to arbitrate. We would undercut the Act and
defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly as only conferring juris-
diction over labor organizations.5 8
If agreements to arbitrate are enforceable as part of the federal
substantive law, why should Black be an exception? There is no
apparent reason to distinguish between agreements to arbitrate
in the absence of contractual differences. Evidently, the Supreme
Court in Black, supporting the traditional position that state law
governs contracts, considered section 301 as a procedural device
rather than as substantive law that provided a federal forum to air
a breach of contract suit.
Mr. Justice Douglas in Lincoln Mills decided that irrespective of
the Norris-La Guardia Act, injunctive aid is available to enforce
agreements to arbitrate. Without delving into the problem of
whether the Court properly carved out an exception to the Norris-
La Guardia Act, criticism has been levied at Lincoln Mills be-
cause of the prospect of judicial interference with arbitration by
injunctive order. This criticism is unrealistic. The social impact
of industrial warfare is often overlooked by those who prefer to
turn away from legal maneuvers and who favor complete autonomy
for the arbitrator. Courts without doubt have needlessly tampered
with the arbitration process. Yet, if industrial peace can be maxi-
mized by the limited procedural interference of the judiciary that
forces contestants to live up to their agreements, the public is
benefited. In Black, the judiciary interfered with the arbitration
process rather than extending a helping hand.
Some scholars adhere to the views eloquently expounded by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter 9 and are concerned with states' rights
and the need to limit the judicial role.6" Congress unquestionably
can pre-empt labor relations in interstate commerce; the question,
when the "signals" are not perfectly clear, is always whether
Congress has exercised this power. Often judges needlessly play
with the problem of determining congressional intent instead of
looking to the realities of the economic situation. The attempts
made to ascertain congressional intent are often so futile and un-
convincing that members of the judiciary leave themselves open to
58. Id. at 456.
59. In the three 1960 Supreme Court decisions pertaining to arbitration,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, at least to some extent, followed a view that would
limit the role of the judiciary. See cases cited note 17 supra.
60. See Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH. L.
REV. 635, 637 (1959).
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ridicule. In reality, those influenced by the Frankfurterian con-
ception of judicial propriety will adhere to one view, whereas oth-
ers steeped in the realism of the economic situation will lean to-
ward the views often expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, at least to some extent, plucked the
strings of states' rights in Lincoln Mills since congressional intent
was not clearly delineated. 1 He recognized that:
[The creation of a new body of law under section 301] present[s]
hazardous opportunities for friction in the regulation of contracts be-
tween employers and unions. [It] involve[s] the division of power be-
tween State and Nation, between state courts and federal courts, in-
cluding the effective functioning of this Court . . ..
But even Mr. Justice Frankfurter admits:
that a fair reading of § 301 in the context of its enactment shows
that the suit that Congress primarily contemplated was the suit against
a union for strike in violation of contract. From this it might be pos-
sible to imply a federal right to bring an action for damages based
on such an event. In the interest of mutuality, so close to the heart
of Congress, we might in turn find a federal right in the union to sue
for a lockout in violation of contract .... 63
The position taken by Mr. Justice Frankfurter can be cited to
point to error in Black. Since the union struck (admittedly not in
violation of a contract), Mr. Justice Frankfurter would seem to
concede that the union has a federal right under section 301 to
sue for damages if it is wrongfully locked out. Even though only a
single worker, Mrs. Walker, was involved, could it not be argued
that she was wrongfully locked out? The line of reasoning here-
in suggested seems but a short step from the position advanced
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Or would Mr. Justice Frankfurter, forc-
ed to make a choice, turn to Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.," and hold that the
right to bring suit is a personal right that cannot be pre-empted
under section 301?6s
61. 353 U.S. at 462. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Lincoln Mills was also
concerned with the authority of the courts to fashion a body of rules.
62. Id. at 464.
63. Id. at 479.
64. 348 U.S. 437 (1954). In this case, the Court concluded that § 301
does not give a federal court jurisdiction over a suit by a labor organiza-
tion to enforce a collective bargaining contract. In Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), the Supreme Court expressly reversed Westing-
house. In fact, Westinghouse had been impliedly reversed by Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), and Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
65. This decision would be illogical because an employer owes a duty to
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Lincoln Mills unqualifiedly states "that
judicial intervention is ill-suited to the special characteristics of
the arbitration process in labor disputes."66 According to Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, enforcing an agreement to arbitrate is judicial
interference, but evidently there is no judicial interference in Black
where the California Supreme Court refused to enforce the arbitra-
tion award, plucking public policy from the ether waves. It is
difficult to rationalize the voting position taken by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Black with his views expressed in Lincoln Mills.
C. THE STEELWORKERS CASES: THE MAGNA CHARTA OF
ARBITRATION?
Prior to 1960, some of the federal courts67 followed the ap-
proach taken by the New York courts in Cutler-Hammer."
There the employer and union differed in their interpretation of a
clause "to discuss payment," and judicial interpretation was sub-
stituted for the arbitration award when the court decided it was
equipped with special insights not available to others. According
to this view, courts can question the arbitrators' judgment in each
case. As a matter of fact, this view is merely a hangover of the
hostility traditionally expressed by the judiciary toward arbitration,
and Lincoln Mills did not eradicate the rule expounded in Cutler-
Hammer.
Because of widespread speculation concerning Lincoln Mills,
the Supreme Court in 1960 handed down three decisions intended
to supply "markers" for court review. These three decisions elimi-
nated the Cutler-Hammer doctrine in federal courts. In Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp.,69 several employees were discharged for par-
ticipating in a temporary walkout. The employer refused to arbi-
trate as provided for in the agreement, and the union successfully
petitioned the district court for an enforcement order. The arbitra-
tor found the discharges improper and reduced punishment to
a ten-day suspension. The employer refused to comply with the
award, and the court of appeals, reversing the district court, de-
cided that the award was not completely enforceable because the
the contracting union as well as to the employee to abide by the arbitrator's
award. The Supreme Court noted this in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195 (1962).
66. 353 U.S. at 463.
67. See, e.g., Davenport v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 511
(2d Cir. 1957).
68. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 297 N.Y.
519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
69. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
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collective bargaining contract had expired.70 Thus, the back pay
award from the date the contract expired and the reinstatement
order were beyond the arbitrator's authority to grant.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and held:
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award
is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agree-
ments. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would
be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards."
The Court adopted a rule popular among arbitrators and labor
economists that the judiciary should not tamper with the decision
of an arbitrator. Although it is not clear whether the arbitrator
exceeded his authority, any doubt should be resolved in the ar-
bitrator's favor according to the Court.72 It appears that the ju-
diciary cannot rightfully refuse to enforce an award unless the ar-
bitrator clearly exceeds his authority.73
In American Manufacturing Co.," the contract contained an
"all disputes" provision as to the "meaning, interpretation and ap-
plication of the provisions of this agreement. '7 5 The agreement
also included a clause giving management the right to punish
employees "for cause" and employment rights of employees were
to be based on seniority "where ability and efficiency are equal." 6
An employee, after receiving workmen's compensation benefits,
claimed that he was entitled to reinstatement under the seniority
clause. The employer would neither reinstate the employee nor ar-
bitrate, and the district court and court of appeals"7 refused to
order arbitration.
The Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, decided
that section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Acte' favors arbitration,
and since the agreement contained an "all disputes" clause, even
an apparently unjustified claim must be processed. Mr. Justice
Douglas said:
70. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327
(1959).
71. 363 U.S. at 596.
72. Id. at 597-98. Presumably Mr. Justice Douglas would adhere to the
same viewpoint if the arbitrator decided that he was not empowered to hear
the controversy.
73. This approach still presents the problem of deciding whether an ar-
bitrator clearly exceeds his authority. Judges hostile to arbitration will find
it possible to indicate that authority has been clearly exceeded.
74. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
75. Id. at 565.
76. Id. at 565-66.
77. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.
1959).
78. 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1958).
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The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed
to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It
is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is
making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether
the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpreta-
tion for the arbitrator.79
Shouldn't the arbitration board in Black have been accorded the
same judicial courtesy?
Mr. Justice Douglas was concerned with the failure of the ju-
diciary to come to grips with economic realities and the unwar-
ranted "preoccupation with ordinary contract law.""0 Could it be
argued that the California Supreme Court in Black was unneces-
sarily preoccupied with contract law rather than with the mainte-
nance of industrial peace in accordance with the system provided
in the Taft-Hartley Act? There is no apparent reason to find a
"preoccupation" in Lincoln Mills, but not in Black. In Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Lincoln Mills, Senator Taft is
quoted in support of pre-emption:
"[O]f course, the basis for the jurisdiction is the Federal law-in
other words, we are saying that all matters of collective-bargaining
contracts shall be made in certain ways. . . . I don't quite see why
suits regarding such collective-bargaining contracts, when made, are
not properly the subject of Federal law .... 81
The employer in Warrior & Gulp2 furloughed indefinitely cer-
tain plant maintenance employees after independent contractors
had been hired to do the work. Independent contractors then of-
fered to hire some of the furloughed employees at a reduced wage.
Included in the collective bargaining contract were "no-strike"
and "all disputes" provisions, although legal issues and manage-
ment prerogatives were excluded from the agreement to arbitrate.
The employer refused to arbitrate the layoffs under the "all dis-
putes" provision and the union sought an enforcement order
under section 301.
The Supreme Court took the position that the union-management
agreement determines whether a dispute is arbitrable. Since fed-
eral policy favors arbitration, an agreement should be enforced
unless the subject matter is clearly excluded. Thus, all doubt is re-
solved in favor of the arbitrator's decision, whether for or against
79. 363 U.S. at 567-68.
80. Id. at 567.
81. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 526 (1957).
82. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
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arbitrability. Mr. Justice Clark in Black went out of his way, it
seems, to cast doubt on the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
The employer in Warrior & Gulf contended that the manage-
ment prerogative clause gave the company exclusive control over
the contracting out of work. The Court decided that "the ablest
judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and com-
petence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because
he cannot be similarly informed." 3 If the point previously made
is accepted, that state courts lack jurisdiction to apply their own
laws, then Black has been reversed by implication because the au-
thority of the arbitrator was apparently contractually unlimited-'
To buttress this position further, in Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney," a 1962 Supreme Court decision, Mr. Justice Stewart,
writing for a unanimous Court, announced that section 301 and
Lincoln Mills did not oust state courts from jurisdiction and that
controversies involving contracts could be heard in a state court.
But Mr. Justice Stewart, in writing the majority opinion for the Su-
preme Court in Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour
Co.,"8 concluded that although a state court may have the neces-
sary jurisdiction to hear a controversy involving section 301,
federal law must be applied.
The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive prin-
ciples of federal labor law must be paramount ....
More important, the subject matter of § 301 (a) "is peculiarly one
that calls for uniform law." ... The possibility that individual contract
terms might have different meanings under state and federal law would
inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and
administration of collective agreements. .... 87
If state and federal law "might have different meanings" and "in-
evitably, exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation
and administration of collective agreements," why is not the same
disruption evident in Black?
III. HAS BLACK v. CUTTER LABORATORIES
BEEN OVERRULED?
Once federal policy is adopted favoring arbitration, state law
necessarily disappears from the scene. Thus, state public policy
or state contract law should not be interjected to oust federal juris-
83. Id. at 582.
84. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
85. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
86. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
87. Id. at 103.
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diction. Evidently counsel in Black did not consider shopping
about for a more favorable forum, particularly after the two lower
court opinions in California favored the arbitrator's award.8
When the California Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, it
may have been too late to consider moving the case to the NLRB
on the basis of an unfair labor practice charge or to a federal
court for other reasons. In addition, the attorneys for Mrs. Walker
may have been confident that the United States Supreme Court
would adopt their point of view.89 Furthermore, Black arose be-
fore Lincoln Mills, the first Supreme Court decision declaring that
section 301 created a new substantive right. Finally, the Norris-La
Guardia Act limits the use of the injunction in federal courts in-
volving "labor disputes" so that the state tribunal may have ap-
peared more favorable.
Whatever the reason may have been for proceeding in a state
court, it seems unnecessary to allow an employer to nullify an
agreement to arbitrate. The many advantages of arbitration over a
legal proceeding, such as the expertise of the arbitrator, speed, and
lesser costs, are done away with when court intervention is per-
mitted. As a general rule, limiting the role of the judiciary seems
to be the better policy, and the three 1960 Steelworkers decisions
prohibiting judicial interference with the arbitration process un-
questionably adopt such a policy. Since the employer in Black
was not engaged in defense work and Mrs. Walker held only a
clerical position, the better policy is one of judicial "hands-off." In
Black there was evidence of industrial unrest that erupted in a
strike. The dispute related to wage and other contractual issues,
and no evidence was produced indicating that communist philoso-
phy was being spread or that a revolution was in the wind. Yet the
Supreme Court in Black permitted state public policy to prevail
over the need expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act to promote collec-
tive bargaining and arbitration.
If the need for collective bargaining is fully accepted, then fed-
eral legislation necessarily takes priority over state control even
where Congress fails to signal pre-emption clearly. An exception
is sometimes made on the basis of public safety.90 But even then
88. See Petition for Certiorari, pp. 13-14, Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S.
292 (1955).
89. A curious aspect of the Black case is that the brief submitted to the
United States Supreme Court urged federal pre-emption on the basis of § 7
of the Taft-Hartley Act. Id. at 32; Brief for Petitioner, pp. 41-42, 84-88,
Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1955). Yet, neither the majority nor
the dissent in Black specifically considered this point.
90. There was violence on the picket line in the following cases: Young-
dahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment
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care must be exercised that the attempt at state control does not
interfere with federal regulation." Black permits such interfer-
ence under the guise of state public policy, a discordant note when
the need for labor-management harmony is considered.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has taken the position that federal ju-
risdiction should not be exercised in peripheral matters.92 Fed-
eral interest expressed in national security and the promotion of
arbitration and collective bargaining can hardly be considered as
peripheral matters. Lincoln Mills stands for the proposition that
collective bargaining is not a peripheral matter, and under Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson, national security must be controlled by federal
officials rather than by state authorities. Even McCarroll,11 a Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court decision, holds that a state court must ap-
ply federal substantive law governing labor-management con-
tracts," and in Lucas Flour Co.,95 the Supreme Court unequivo-
cally agreed.
Most collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration."
The need to develop a system of private jurisprudence, minimiz-
ing court interference, is apparent. Based on Black, courts can
interject public policy as a means of circumventing the intent of
the parties who contract for arbitration. Lincoln Mills supports the
notion that arbitration is a better device to settle disputes than is
court adjudication.
Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Erwin Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers, 235
N.C. 107, 68 S.E.2d 813 (1952).
91. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
92. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958)
(by implication). This leaves open to the courts the interpretation of periph-
ery.
93. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.
2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
94. Although the position taken in this Article would exclude state juris-
diction, there is another problem involving the proper federal forum that
requires further judicial consideration. Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley
Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the NLRB to prevent unfair labor prac-
tices. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958). In accordance with
Lincoln Mills, § 301 creates a federal substantive law for which remedies are
available if an agreement to arbitrate is breached. If the controversy in-
volves an unfair labor practice and a contract violation, but charges have
not been preferred before the NLRB, can a court adjudicate the controversy
under § 301? See Lodge 12, Dist. 371, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron
Iron Works, 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
The Supreme Court, in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962),
decided that a court can adjudicate an unfair labor practice that violates a
collective bargaining agreement.
95. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
96. Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in Col-
lective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1274 (1957).
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In Black, the United States Supreme Court avoided consider-
ing pre-emption by holding that a federal question was not pre-
sented and accepted state contract law and policy as sufficient rea-
son for dismissing certiorari. Black stands for the proposition
that state policy can be interjected into a union-management con-
tract even though the effect of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act
is nullified. If Black is followed, the federal courts would permit
state law to prevail in all situations where an employer refuses to
arbitrate. Lincoln Mills clearly states that federal law will control
agreements to arbitrate.9" It seems that the United States Su-
preme Court in Lincoln Mills reversed the stand taken by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Black.
The three 1960 Steelworkers cases represent additional evidence
of the reversal of Black. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. holds that
the judiciary cannot examine the merits of an arbitration award;"
American Manufacturing Co. indicates that court review is limited
when an arbitrator is authorized to proceed under an "all dis-
putes" provision;99 Warrior & Gulf states that an agreement to
arbitrate should be enforced without equivocation.' In Black,
the California Supreme Court was permitted to reverse the arbi-
trator. It seems reasonable to assume that under the Steelworkers
cases the arbitrator can no longer be overruled so easily. Further-
more, Lucas Flour Co., a 1962 decision, holds that a state court
must apply federal law. Because Black is often classified as a
civil liberties case rather than a labor law case, its reversal has
been overlooked. But the ability of the courts to question the ar-
bitrator and needlessly badger the arbitration process has been
substantially clipped by the three Steelworkers decisions. There is
already substantial evidence that the courts are not as anxious to
question the arbitrator.' Cannot an assumption be made that
the same ground rules should pertain to Black even though com-
munism was involved?
97. 353 U.S. at 457.
98. 363 U.S. at 597-98.
99. 363 U.S. at 567-68.
100. 363 U.S. at 583-84.
101. Radio Corp. v. Association of Professional Eng'r Employees, 291
F.2d 105 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 898 (1961); Local 95, Office
Employees Union v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 287 F.2d 452 (7th Cir.
1961); International Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Local 400, Int'l Union of Elec. Work-
ers, 286 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1960); American Brake Shoe Co. v. Local 49,
UAW, 285 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 873 (1962);
Procter & Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 195
F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), aif'd, 298 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1962); Retail
Department Store Employees v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 L.R.R.M. 2354(W.D. Wash. 1960); Local 18, UMW v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 47
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With respect to pre-emption where communism is an issue, evi-
dence was available prior to 1947 indicating some infiltration
in the union movement.1 12 When the Taft-Hartley Act was en-
acted in 1947, section 9(h) required union officials to submit
a noncommunist affidavit, 0 3 although an employer was not per-
mitted to question its veracity.'0 One reason for this denial was
the need to protect the civil rights of those filing affidavits. Since
employers have equated communism with unionism, power to take
action was given to the Department of Justice. It seems logical to
conclude that Congress exercised its power of pre-emption by
providing for the non-communist affidavit. Mrs. Walker in Black
did submit a non-communist affidavit.
Other federal legislation would indicate federal pre-emption
where communism is an issue. Under the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950,"05 the communist and communist front or-
ganizations were to be controlled by the Subversive Activities
Control Board. In 1954, the investigative power of this Board
was extended to communist infiltrated organizations. 00 Under
the 1954 legislation, labor unions dominated by communists can
be investigated and regulated by preventing known members of
organizations registered with the Subversive Activities Control
Board from holding office or employment with the union.0 7 If
the union itself is required to register, it cannot act as an exclu-
sive bargaining representative.'08 Are not these positive signs of
pre-emption?
Another indication of federal pre-emption is the finding by the
arbitration board in Black that the employer discharged Mrs.
Walker for her active role in the union, a violation of sections
8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act.0 9 Because of the
extensive protection given to union advocates in Taft-Hartley, it
seems that state law should not be permitted to prevail. 10 Al-
L.R.R.M. 2269 (D. Idaho 1960); UAW v. Waltham Screw Co., 47
L.R.R.M. 2196 (D. Mass. 1960).
102. H.R. REP. No. 1, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1941).
103. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146
(1947). This section has been repealed and replaced by § 201 (d) of the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. 73 Stat. 525 (1959).
104. NLRB v. Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp., 214 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954); West Tex. Utils. Co. v. NLRB, 184 F.2d
233 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951).
105. 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1958).
106. 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 792(a) (1958).
107. 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1)(E) (1958).
108. 68 Stat. 779-80 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 792(h)(2) (1958).
109. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1958).
110. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Rd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). Here,
among other things, an employer refused to bargain after a union had been
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though mentioned in the brief presented to the United States
Supreme Court, there is no positive indication in Black that fed-
eral pre-emption based on the commission of an unfair labor
practice was even considered.
A more difficult problem in Black is whether an arbitrator
properly hears a case where an unfair labor practice is committed.
The three Steelworkers cases protecting the award from court re-
view did not consider unfair practice violations. In United Elec-
trical Workers v. Worthington Corp.,"' Judge Magruder decided
that the arbitrator could make an award in similar circumstances.
Two employees were discharged for refusing to testify before the
House Committee on Un-American Activities. The employer, who
appeared before the arbitrator under a reservation, claimed that
an award could not be made because of federal pre-emption bas-
ed on the Taft-Hartley Act. The arbitrator ruled in favor of rein-
stating the discharged employees, and the union petitioned the dis-
trict court to enforce the award in accordance with section 301. In-
sofar as the union claimed irregularity of discharge, the arbitrator
could, according to Judge Magruder, hear the dispute even though
there may have been a violation of section 8(a) (5)."'
In Worthington, Judge Magruder traced the development of
federal pre-emption in the realm of labor law and noted that the
only controversies in interstate commerce over which a state court
properly exercises jurisdiction are violence"3 or a tort com-
pensable under state law." 4 Judge Magruder carefully noted that
the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether an arbitrator
could make a decision where there is both a contract violation
and an unfair labor practice." 5 Judge Magruder ruled in favor of
the arbitrator because "the majority decision of the arbitrators in
certified by the NLRB, a possible violation of § 8(a)(5). 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958). The Supreme Court refused to permit
the state to take jurisdiction even though the NLRB would not adjudicate
the controversy because of the monetary yardsticks then in effect.
111. 236 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1956).
112. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958). It is perhaps
noteworthy that Judge Magruder did not interject state public policy. As a
point of distinction, however, Judge Magruder was asked to enforce the
award and the federal law, while in Black the California Supreme Court
dealt with state law.
113. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Allen-Bradley Lo-
cal 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
315 U.S. 740 (1942).
114. International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
115. 236 F.2d at 367.
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fact passed only upon the wrongful discharge aspect of the case
and turned aside the refusal to bargain aspect.""'
On December 10, 1962, the Supreme Court decided in Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n11 that a state court can adjudicate a dis-
pute arising under section 301 even if the employer's actions con-
stitute an unfair labor practice. Mr. Justice White, writing the ma-
jority opinion, could find nothing in the Taft-Hartley Act that
prevented concurrent NLRB and state court jurisdiction. By anal-
ogy, it would appear that an arbitrator can make an award if an
unfair labor practice occurs because there is nothing in the Taft-
Hartley Act to prevent it. Mr. Justice White did indicate that court
jurisdiction could be denied if there was compelling reason; pre-
sumably, jurisdiction could also be denied an arbitrator for a simi-
lar reason.
The United States Supreme Court decision in Black is dated
June 4, 1956, while Judge Magruder's opinion in Worthington is
dated July 31, 1956. Thus, Judge Magruder spoke in Worthington
seven weeks after the Black decision was published. Had Worthing-
ton been published prior to Black, one speculates whether the
prestige of Judge Magruder would have influenced the majority of
the United States Supreme Court in Black to favor the arbitration
process rather than a nebulous state policy.
CONCLUSION
I believe that Lincoln Mills. the three Steelworkers cases, and
Lucas Flour Co. overrule Black. There are, of course, legal prob-
lems yet to be ruled upon. In a society committed to arbitration,
it can be anticipated that spheres of control will be rapidly defined
by the Supreme Court to minimize labor-management friction. The
Court, in Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers cases, has already
plotted a course favoring arbitration over court intervention. It
currently appears that interference with the arbitration process will
not be tolerated by the Court even where state public policy is
interjected. Since section 301 favors federal contract law, state
control must take a back seat unless it fits into the federal scheme.1 s
116. Id. at 370.
117. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
118. In Lincoln Mills, Justice Douglas indicated that to create a federal
substantive law,
the range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of
the problem .... But state law, if compatible with the purpose of§ 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectu-
ate the federal policy .... Any state law applied, however, will be
absorbed as federal law and wil not be an independent source of pri-
vate rights.
353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
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Pre-emption is also indicated in Black because of the federal
legislation enacted to corner the communist." 9 The rationale ap-
pearing in Pennsylvania v. Nelson"' and Lucas Flour Co. 2'
supports this conclusion. 22 Furthermore, pre-emption and the ap-
plication of federal law is indicated in Black because of the unfair
labor practices set out in the Taft-Hartley Act. Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n supports this conclusion. Black is a decision that af-
fects both civil rights and labor law, and it is in need of recon-
sideration on both counts.
Because Black has not been expressly overruled, state courts
continue to follow its reasoning. In Carey v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,"-3 the union requested an order in a state court to force
the employer to arbitrate, as required by contract, after three em-
ployees were discharged for invoking the first and fifth amend-
ments before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
The New York Supreme Court decided that the employer was not
obligated to arbitrate, stating:
The three employees were perhaps within their constitutional rights in
refusing to answer the questions put to them and even to their warped
political beliefs but they have no constitutional right to employment
The firing was for "just cause" as a matter of law and there-
fore there is no arbitrable dispute.124
The New York court, citing Black, stated that the people of New
York, as well as California, abhor communism, and that the ad-
vocacy of a foreign economic system is contrary to public policy in
New York. It must be admitted that the New York court matched
the fervor of the California Supreme Court.
In Local 453, International Union of Electrical Workers v. Otis
Elevator Co., 2' an employee was discharged for gambling on his
119. See statutes cited notes 30-32 supra.
120. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
121. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
122. If communism was intended as an exception to federal policy favor-
ing arbitration, it should have been clearly enunciated in legislation or con-
tractually excluded. Since unions and employers must bargain in good faith
and must sign contracts if requested after an agreement is reached, federal
law necessarily controls. The Taft-Hartley Act does not provide for class ex-
ceptions to policy favoring arbitration. Thus, all disputes should be arbi-
trated in the absence of a contractual exclusion. Although Congress has al-
ready expressed a strong desire to prevent the spread of communism, it
would seem that the federal interest lies in controlling subversion rather
than membership. If a state court is permitted to deal with federal prob-
lems, as indicated in Dowd Box Co., federal law prohibiting communism
and controlling subversion should prevail rather than state law as in Black.
Lucas Flour Co. calls for such an approach.
123. 31 Lab. Arb. 74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
124. Id. at 74-75.
125. 206 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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employer's premises. The arbitrator ruled that the employee should
be reinstated. On a petition to enforce the award, a federal dis-
trict court decided that the award was unenforceable because it
was against the public policy of New York to indulge in crime.
The district court judge cited Black as authority for his decision.
It is hoped that this Article will help to dispel decisions similar
to Carey and Otis Elevator Co. for the reasons assigned.

